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COMMENT
By

NEAL

R.

STAMP*

T he outset, I completely agree with Professor Monypenny that

the most important decisions made in an educational institution are not those that turn solely or directly on legal concepts.
Clearly, the most important decisions are those involving questions
of educational policy, financial policy, community relations, and
similar policy matters. But this is not to say that the legal concepts
which underlie these policy questions are of little consequence.
Rather, it is only when we have a common understanding and acceptance of these underlying legal concepts that we are truly free to
devote our attention to the important matters of educational policy.
We are open to misinterpretation (and there are those who do so
misinterpret) if we permit our preoccupation with policy matters
to override legal concepts to the point of obscurity.
In the present-day university, I sense a widespread confusion
about the nature and applicability of some of these basic legal concepts in the university-student relationship, and I assume that this
confusion is one reason this particular conference was called. University administrators are well accustomed to, and much experienced
in, dealing with the policy questions cited above. Until very recently,
they have had little need to focus attention on underlying legal concepts. Now they are finding some basic and long-established policy
postures subject to challenge by the student or faculty activist and
by other interests from off campus. Many of these challengers attack the underlying legal basis for university policy and practices,
not because their legal rights have been so seriously violated (except
in race discrimination cases), but rather because experience has demonstrated that the legal attack hits the administrator in his most exposed and vulnerable flank.
This point is underscored by the remarks of Mr. Schwartz of
the National Student Association in the opening session of this conference. He demonstrated considerable contempt for any serious
legal analysis of the university-student relationship, saying he was
interested only in using the law as a political tool for effecting
change in university policy.
Thus we find ourselves with an interesting situation in which
the university administrator, on the one hand, has little experience
with the formalities and technicalities of the law, and the student
*University Counsel and Secretary of the Corporation, Cornell University; A.B. 1940,
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activist, on the other hand, is exploiting this very lack of experience
to confound the administrator, disrupt the relaxed, daily routine of
the university community, and, in a surprising number of cases, win
concessions which have little basis in law or educational policy. It
is an interesting sidelight of the present confusion that the typical
college or university administrator, far from being calloused and insensitive to the rights of individual students, is so liberal in spirit
and kindly in nature that he falls easy prey to the loud but often
unsubstantiated protestations of the small but highly vocal group
of student activists at his institution. Consequently, I consider it
very important that we do give full and sharp attention to the legal
aspects of the university-student relationship without delay. I think
it important that we analyze this relationship in its several facets in
order to reassure our administrator-colleagues and help them to get
on with the critically important questions of educational policy as
Professor Monypenny has suggested.
However, as an operating legal counsel for a fairly large and
diversified university, my approach to the legal aspects of the university-student relationship is very much different than those of the
legal academicians. Whereas the teacher or scholar appropriately
deals in broad theories, documenting and amplifying by reference to
specific applications of these theories - usually by the footnote technique - the practicing legal counsel works in almost the opposite
direction. In the area of free speech, the scholar begins with the first
amendment to the Constitution and gives the doctrine meaning by
developing its application to various factual situations as considered
by the courts - usually the Supreme Court. On the other hand, the
operating legal counsel is initially confronted with a statement of
facts, usually flimsy and often obscure as to significant content. His
first problem is to analyze these facts in terms of their legal implications. Before viewing the facts in terms of the first amendment, or
any other constitutional doctrine, he must apply to them a whole
series of graduated regulatory concepts, running from the provisions
of a student conduct code through trustee legislation, institutional
charter, and finally local, state, or federal law. In fact, it can be said
that the operating legal counsel works in the area of the scholar's
"footnotes" and that his best work -- solving the problem without
ever going to litigation - is not even a footnote. I make a point of
this difference in approach because I think it is important for us to
characterize the point of view or posture from which several of the
distinguished papers at this conference have been presented. It is
one thing to deliver a sweeping analysis of the law as it is or as the
speaker thinks it should be. It is quite another thing to deal with the
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day-by-day specifics of the relationship between the university and
its individual students.
Against the background of the theme for this conference it is
important to consider what the legal nature of a university really is.
At this conference, the university has been variously described as a
"community" or an "institution," but these terms are hardly descriptive of the university as a legal entity. The university is in fact a
corporation. It has a charter from the state and a set of bylaws
from which it draws its life and which, at the same time, prescribe
and limit its purposes, powers, and functions. To be sure, the corporate purpose of a university is rather special: namely, to educate
young people, to provide a storehouse of existing knowledge, and
to add to this knowledge through scholarship and research.
If we look to the historical background of public and private
educational systems in this country, we are reminded that a basic
legal rationale for their existence is the interest of the state in an
educated citizenry as being essential to a well-ordered and successful
society. A university must, therefore, be responsive to this basic
legal policy consideration, since, of necessity, it bears upon the university's legal rights, powers, and responsibilities in its relationships
with students and other members of the community. In the university-student relationship, all of the rights and responsibilities of both
parties stem from this basic concept-the university's interest in
educating and its obligations to society, and the student's interest in
being educated. Viewed in this light, the university must have greater
freedom and flexibility in controlling the activities of the student
than do local, state, or national governments in controlling the activities of the citizen. At the same time, and this point also requires
emphasis, this greater freedom and flexibility which is so necessary
to the successful educational process has no relevancy with respect
to matters which are not central to, or reasonably incidental to, that
educational process. Thus, the university-student relationship is a
limited relationship, but within its limitations the university must be
free to exercise discretionary controls if the relationship is to be successful.
Let me enumerate briefly some of the more prominent relationships which exist between the university and the student involving
the application of various legal concepts. First, there is the individual's admission as a student. The university is prohibited from discriminating on the basis of race, creed, or national origin, but otherwise it practices widespread discrimination in the selection of students. The individual applicant, when accepted into the status of a
student, acquires both rights and responsibilities which stem from
this status. These rights are not the civil rights of citizenship, and
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thus all of the technical trappings of procedural due process which
control the relationship between state and citizen are not applicable
here. At the same time, the student's rights are recognized by society as being of very substantial value so that the university is not
free to terminate his status without a basically fair process in the
light of the total relationship between the two parties.
A second corporate relationship pertains to the provision of
room and meals. Fundamentally, this is a landlord-tenant relationship and is normally regulated by a fairly specific contract. Other
corporate relationships have to do with the provision of instruction
(teachers, classrooms, laboratories, library, etc.), health services,
and public services such as utilities, traffic control, and police and
fire protection.
One corporate relationship which requires special mention is
the financial support for the student. In the first place, the typical
university absorbs a very large portion of the cost of instruction
above and beyond the amount of tuition and fees paid. Secondly,
the university provides direct financial assistance to the individual
student from its own funds or from outside funds which are administered by the university. This relationship points up the fiduciary character of the total special purpose relationships between
university and student.
In analyzing these corporate relationships, it is apparent that,
rather than one particular legal principle controlling the entire relationship, a series of legal principles are directly and appropriately
applicable to its various aspects. The first legal principle which
comes to mind, in a negative sense, is the doctrine of in loco parentis.
I say "negative" sense because so many student groups, faculty
groups, and institutions have recently made a big point of announcing that they no longer adhere to the doctrine of in loco parentis.
In my mind, this never was a legitimate concept because it grossly
oversimplifies the relationship between a university and its students.
On the one hand, no university with a student body numbering in
the thousands could possibly assume the role of a surrogate parent
for each student. On the other hand, universities have adopted policies and practices in the past - and will hopefully continue to do so
in the future - which are solicitous of the welfare of its students. As
a case in point, we at Cornell issued the report of a University Commission in September 1967, in which it was made abundantly clear
that the University no longer recognized in loco parentis as a viable
doctrine. Less than two months later, the University adopted a policy
with respect to the dissemination of student records which gave the
students a privileged protection substantially in excess of their rights
under the law. The point here is that, while the university does not

1968

COMMENT

and should not pretend to regulate every aspect of the student's
private life, the university can and must continue to regulate and
protect those aspects of the individual student's activity which are
pertinent to the university's purposes and the university-student
relationship.
A second legal concept which comes to mind is the law of contract. We have heard much at this conference to the effect that contract is no longer a viable concept for regulation of the universitystudent relationship. Such broad statements must be taken with at
least a few grains of salt. It certainly is true that the university can
no longer print a very broad statement in the annual catalog, reserving the right to expel the student without a hearing or without
cause, and then expect the matter to stand up in the courts on the
theory that the statement was a contract term between the parties
which was accepted by the student at the time of registration. However, this is not to say that the basic university-student relationship
does not involve the elements of a contract. It is much more appropriate to say that public policy, as enforced by the courts, will no
longer countenance the enforcement of such an arbitrary contract
provision in this particular type of relationship. In short, the contract concept is used daily in a most satisfactory manner in many
facets of the university-student relationship. For example, we hear
no complaints about the need for formalities of procedural due
process when a student is dismissed for simple failure to pay tuition - the university's right of dismissal in this instance is certainly
based upon the law of contract.
I mentioned earlier the fiduciary or trust concept which applies
to the underlying eleemosynary nature of the institution as well as
to the more specific provision of financial assistance to the individual
student. This relationship and the legal and equitable principles
which govern it go far toward characterizing the total relationship
between university and student.
Finally, the university has a right to regulate its students for
the purpose of protecting life and property - a power which can
best be described as a sort of private "police" power. While a few
universities have the power of arrest on the basis of specific statutory authority, all universities are recognized as having this basic
right to regulate the activity of the individual when it may be harmful to the life or property of other members of the university community or of the university itself.
Thus, I hope it is clear from these few remarks that there are
several different legal concepts which are variously applicable to
different aspects of the total university-student relationship- the
relationship between this special purpose corporation and the in-
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dividual citizen who has been admitted and registered as a student.
Hanging over all aspects of this relationship and over all of these
legal concepts which have been discussed are the constitutional
rights of the parties. The individual citizen who becomes a student
surely does not forfeit the constitutional rights which are available
to all citizens under all circumstances. I state the matter in this
fashion because I think there is a tendency at the present time to
lose our perspective, particularly when dealing with student demonstrations or other activist maneuvers. When we are confronted with
a student demonstration, we are not ready to talk about the constitutional rights of anybody until we have engaged in a thorough
analysis of the facts surrounding the demonstration and have applied appropriate university regulations, or local and state law. It
is my own experience that this approach to the problem very often
results in a resolution of doubts, if not an actual solution, long before a consideration of constitutional concepts becomes necessary.
In conclusion, I would emphasize the importance in this very
confusing area of making very clear-cut distinctions between a legal
analysis of the university-student relationship on the one hand and
a discussion of applicable educational, philosophical, or sociological
concepts on the other. When there is a confrontation between university and student we need to know the respective rights and responsibilities of the parties. We may desire to waive some of these
rights (on behalf of the university) for reasons of educational policy, but, if this be the case, it is important that we do so knowingly.
With respect to the student, it is most important that we ascertain
his rights in the particular aspect of the relationship which is at
issue. Too often, questions involving the university-student relationship have found their way into the courts because attention was not
given to recognition of the student's rights early in the controversy.
If we do make clear distinctions between legal rights and educational
policy, we certainly can follow Professor Monypenny's admonition
to place emphasis on the educational aspect of this very sensitive
relationship within a legal framework which is not unduly restrictive or burdensome to either university or student.

